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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
The magic effect of UN 
resolutions
Diplomatic restraint and a lack of protection in the 
ECJ Shepherd C-472/13 case
Last week, the Court of Justice of the EU delivered its 
judgment on an unusual asylum case. It had to decide 
whether and under what conditions non-combat military 
personnel fearing to become involved in the commission of 
war crimes could claim refugee status under the EU 
Qualification Directive (QD). Valentin Jeutner has already 
presented the facts of the case and a first assessment of the 
judgment, in which he stressed the strong legalistic 
approach of the court. I agree with his preliminary 
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observations. However, I would like to add a few remarks on 
three problematic aspects of the judgment.
The first aspect concerns the relevant standard for proving 
the “likelihood” of being involved in the commission of war 
crimes. Not only does the Court reveal a very legalistic 
approach by suggesting that existence of legislation 
penalizing war crimes renders their commission 
“implausible” (para. 42). But the Court also draws severe 
procedural consequences from the existence of such 
legislation. In such case, the burden of proving that it is 
“highly likely that [war crimes] will be committed” (para. 43) 
is with the applicant. Obviously, this will be hard to prove. 
Moreover, the Court does not apply a consistent standard 
throughout the judgment: While it initially only requires that 
participation in the commission of war crimes must be 
“reasonably plausible” (para. 38), it later requires a “high 
likelihood”. More importantly, the standard of “high 
likelihood” does not correspond to the standard normally 
required in international and European refugee law. As 
expressed in Article 2 (f) of the revised QD (2011/95/EU) an 
applicant is to be recognized as a refugee if he or she faces a 
“real risk” of being prosecuted for one of the relevant 
reasons. To require a “high likelihood” is incompatible with 
this standard. The Court therefore significantly raises the 
required standard for military personnel refusing to perform 
their service.
Interpreting the facts of the case instead of EU law
On a methodological level, the Court blurs the line between 
interpretation of EU law, which is its genuine task, and the 
application of that law to the concrete case, which clearly is 
not its task. Here, the Court does not refrain from 
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pronouncing itself on the interpretation of the facts of the 
concrete case. To the contrary, by suggesting that the facts 
do not support the argument of a disproportionate or 
discriminatory persecution in the sense of Article 9(2)(b) and 
(c) QD, the Court gets involved in the interpretation of the 
facts and tries to control the outcome of the concrete case 
(paras. 47–56). After having gone so much into the details 
and the concrete solution of the case, the Court adds a fig 
leaf: “It is, however, for the national authorities to ascertain 
whether” the sentence faced by Mr. Shepherd is 
disproportionate and discriminatory or not (para. 56).
Similarly, where the Court refers to the applicant’s voluntary 
enlistment in the armed forces and his voluntary re-
enlistment after his first period in Iraq, it not only 
establishes a criterion, but clearly suggests how the national 
authorities have to weigh this fact in the case at hand. The 
Court ignores the fact that Mr. Shepherd had argued that he 
had only re-enlisted because he was promised not to be 
send to Iraq again. Moreover, the Court decides that an 
applicant may only successfully apply for a refugee status if 
he or she has sought recognition as a conscientious objector, 
where such a procedure is available (paras. 44 and 45). Mr. 
Shepherd argued that in his case recognition as a 
conscientious objector would be unsuccessful, because he 
did not completely reject the use of force and war, but only 
feared to contribute to the commission of war crimes. By 
requiring that an applicant has to first seek recognition as a 
conscientious objector anyway, the Court develops an 
extremely high burden of proof, which may almost never be 
met by any soldier from a “Western” country, and certainly 
not by Mr. Shepherd.
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Ignorance or naivety? The misconception of the concept of 
legitimate use of force
By holding that a mandate of the UN Security Council or “a 
consensus on the part of the international community” offer 
“every guarantee that no war crimes will be 
committed.” (para. 41) the Court reveals a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the concept of legitimate use of force 
under international law. Under the UN Charter, a mandate of 
the Security Council legitimizes the use of force as an 
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force 
under international law. That’s it! The legitimizing force of 
the mandate ends here. Such a mandate does not imply any 
statement on the way in which the military action is 
performed. Of course, war crimes are forbidden in military 
actions covered by a mandate of the UN Security Council, 
but so are they in any other military conflict. It remains 
entirely unclear why and how a UN mandate should 
guarantee that no war crimes are committed during an 
armed conflict. Such an assumption is only plausible if you 
believe that the letter of the law determines reality. But then 
why check political measures at all?
Moreover, the Court does not only miraculously extend the 
legitimizing effect of a UN mandate but also ascribes such an 
effect to any military operation which is based on an 
“international consensus.” It remains unclear what the Court 
means by this. Does it mean no war crimes are to be 
expected when “we and our Western friends” agree to go to 
war? Does it imply that the war in Iraq was based on such a 
consensus? It clearly was not. At the time, many countries 
from all regions of the world criticized the invasion of Iraq as 
unlawful, and the Security Council initially refused to give a 
clear mandate to the “coalition of the willing.” And finally: 
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how does the Court come from an obscure “international 
consensus” to the legal effect of jacking up the burden of 
proof to a potential refugee?
Finally, the Court not only seems to tremendously 
overestimate the authority of the UN Security Council, it 
also puts an extraordinary amount of confidence in this 
institution. Against the background of the Kadi
jurisprudence, one may argue that the Court intentionally 
signaled that it acknowledges decisions of other 
international institutions within the European legal order. If 
this is the case, it failed to do so convincingly, because it 
fundamentally misunderstood the legal effect and logic of a 
UN mandate. I think it is more likely that the Court simply 
wants to trust UN sanctioned military actions for purely 
political and diplomatic reasons. The case of Mr. Shepherd 
vividly illustrates how inappropriate such a diplomatic 
approach is in the context of refugee protection. The idea of 
trust may already be a delicate one in internal European 
affairs (see here and here), but it becomes dangerous if 
applied with regard to the way in which military operations 
are conducted.
This holds particularly true when the protection of refugees 
is concerned: The protection of refugees needs to operate 
on an individual basis, where the individual applicant always 
retains a realistic option to prove that he needs to be 
protected. In the case of Mr. Shepherd, this has become a 
rather theoretical option.
A glimpse of hope: The floor is open
Does the Court not do any good in this case? Only a cautious 
answer to this question seems appropriate. The Court made 
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it very clear that EU asylum law is in principle applicable to 
all military personnel. Given the increasing number of 
military conflicts around the world and the many armed 
conflicts that are not covered by a UN mandate, it is indeed 
possible that the Court opened the door to asylum for a new 
group of applicants in the future. The war between Russia 
and the Ukraine might become a first case where this new 
approach may be applied with different results than in the 
case of Mr. Shepherd. The floor is open for new cases.
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